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Abstract
The ability to make international roaming calls is of increasing importance to customers.
However, there are various complaints that prices of retail roaming are intransparent,
rigid and at levels that are unrelated to the cost of carriage. The focus if the paper is on
wholesale roaming, which is the prime determinant of retail roaming prices. The paper
analyses the structural conditions of wholesale roaming markets that have impaired
incentives to competition, namely (1) high combined market share of the two leading
operators combined with second mover disadvantages, and (2) demand externalities
associated with customer ignorance and lack of control over network selection. The
paper argues that a number of developments are under way that are likely to modify this
situation in the future. With the introduction of SIM over-the-air programming, home
mobile operators will be able to direct customers to networks with the lowest charges.
As dual mode handsets become ubiquitous and as new entrant GSM 1800 operators
reach nationwide coverage, second-mover disadvantages will disappear. Given the
relatively small roaming volumes that GSM 1800 operators currently provide, they
should have an incentive to lower charges in exchange for preferred roaming status. On
the demand side of wholesale roaming markets, it will be the larger GSM 900 operators,
and in particular those with a pan-European footprint, that will ask for lower charges in
exchange for preferred roaming status. This could discriminate against mobile operators
in downstream retail markets that do not have a pan-European footprint and that lack
the bargaining power. However, arbitrage by roaming brokers, new entry and wider
geographical markets on the retail roaming level will work against this. Anti-
discrimination rules contained in licenses, competition law or the GSM international
roaming framework should not be applied in a way that impairs the competitive
downward adjustment of wholesale roaming charges.
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1 Introduction
Roaming can be defined as „facility, supported by commercial arrangements between
operators and/or service providers, which enables a subscriber to use his/her radio
telephone equipment on any other network which has entered into a roaming
agreement in the same or another country for both outgoing and incoming calls.“1 When
a subscriber uses his/her radio telephone equipment on a network in another country,
the term „international roaming“ is used.2 International roaming allows subscribers of
mobile networks to use their mobile phone and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card
outside their home country and to make and receive calls abroad while still being billed
by their home mobile operator or service provider (“one phone, one number, one bill”).
This paper deals with international roaming on GSM networks, which is possible in 50
countries/areas in Europe and more than 170 countries/areas of the world; the focus of
the paper is on international roaming in Western Europe.
The ability to make and receive roaming calls is of increasing importance to both
residential and business customers. However, there are various complaints that prices
of retail roaming are intransparent to consumers, rigid and at levels that are unrelated to
the cost of carriage.3 E.g., in November 1999 the International Telecommunications
Users Group (INTUG) published a study showing that the difference in price between
roamed and non-roamed mobile calls4 for the same country-to-country pairs within the
European Union can be as high as 500 percent, and a similar picture emerged in a
follow-up study for 2000.5 The Mobile Roaming Inquiry of the European Commission
showed that, while prices of more competitive non-roamed mobile calls went down,
prices of roamed calls often increased.6 The UK regulator stated that the consumer
does not appear to get a good deal on international roaming and that price competition
on retail roaming calls is not evident.7
The primary focus of this paper is on wholesale roaming services, which are the prime
driver of retail roaming prices.8 The European Commission discovered that, over the
period 1997 - 2000, mobile operators in many cases have substantially raised their
                                               
1 European Commission (1994), p.225.
2 “National roaming” describes the case where a subscriber roams on another network in the same
country
3 Retail roaming services are the services a home mobile operator offers its subscribers allowing them
to use their subscription in other countries, by using the network of mobile operators in the visited
countries.
4 Viewed from a given network, “roamed calls” are those made by visiting subscribers, and “non-
roamed calls” are those made by domestic subscribers. Technically, both calls are largely equivalent,
with the prime exception that roamed calls require a signalling link to the subscriber’s home network to
check his/her status.
5 INTUG (1999, 2001).
6 European Commission (2000), p.3. See also Sauter (2001).
7 Oftel (2000, 2001).
8 Wholesale roaming services are the services a visited mobile operator offers to mobile operators
licensed in other countries, allowing the subscribers of the latter to use the network of the former.
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wholesale roaming rates, while, at the same time, prices of non-roamed (in particular,
domestic non roamed) calls usually went down.9
The paper does not deal with actual market conduct of mobile operators and, in
particular, cannot provide evidence on whether wholesale roaming charges are
excessive or whether there was any collective price fixing. Rather, the thrust of this
paper is on the structural conditions underlying wholesale roaming markets that have
impaired incentives to engage in competitive price undercutting, and on developments
that are likely to intensify competition on the wholesale roaming level in the future.
Chapter 2 gives a brief review of the basics of international roaming in the GSM world.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of supply-side conditions of wholesale roaming markets,
with a focus on structural conditions that are likely to create oligopolistic
interdependency between the leading providers of wholesale roaming services. Chapter
4 provides an analysis of demand side conditions that have impaired incentives to
agree on lower wholesale roaming charges in exchange for preferred roaming status.
The analysis of supply and demand side conditions also demonstrates the prospects for
change and shows the potential for a competitive process of downward price
adjustments. Chapter 5 concludes with a recommendation for application of non-
discrimination rules when dealing with this evolving process.
2 Basics of international roaming
Wholesale roaming services are services a mobile operator of a given country (“visited
network operator”) offers to a mobile operator licensed in another country (“home
network operator”), enabling the subscribers of the latter to use the network of the
former. Wholesale roaming services include the provision of access to the visited
network, and the provision of speech, data, fax and short message services (SMS) to
the roaming subscriber. The provision of a roamed call to a foreign mobile operator’s
subscriber is technically similar to providing a non-roamed call to a domestic subscriber;
it requires little extra functionality other than the signalling between the visited and
home network. What is largely different, however, are underlying contracts and the
marketing and billing relationships.
Wholesale roaming services are the major input for providing retail roaming services.
Retail roaming services are the services a home mobile operator offers its subscribers
allowing them to use their subscription in other countries, by using the network of
mobile operators licensed in those countries. To ensure the best possible service to
their customers, home network operators tend to maximise coverage by concluding
international roaming agreements with (i) operators in a maximum number of countries
and (ii) all mobile operators in a given country.
                                               
9 European Commission (2000), p. 18.
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Wholesale roaming agreements are concluded on a commercial basis between
individual licensed mobile operators that are members of the GSM Association, the
industry body responsible for the development, deployment, evolution and promotion of
the GSM standard. Wholesale roaming agreements are usually (but not necessarily)
reciprocal, that is, both roaming partners reciprocally agree on the provision of
wholesale roaming services. The GSM Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) provides
the general basis for the establishment of international roaming, and the Standard
International Roaming Agreement (STIRA), more explicitly, defines the principles of
bilateral roaming agreements between GSM operators.10
The framework provided by the GSM MoU and STIRA does not deal with international
roaming agreements between licensed GSM operators and organisations that are not
licensed GSM operators, and, so far, there are no such international roaming
agreements in place. Up to now, independant service providers buy international
roaming services from licensed GSM operators in their home country within the
framework of service provider agreements.11 In order to enable a service provider’s
customers to roam abroad, GSM operators in the customer’s home country must
purchase wholesale roaming services from GSM operators in the visited countries and
resell them to the service provider.
Vertical relationships
Figure 1 gives an illustration of the vertical relationships involved in international
roaming. Assume that B1 denotes a customer’s home network operator and A1 his/her
visited network operator. Basically, there are two alternatives to distinguish:
(i) There is an international roaming agreement in place between mobile operators
A1 and B1, and B1 purchases wholesale roaming services from A1. B1 may
provide retail roaming services to its subscribers via an internal sales unit, or B1
may resell the wholesale roaming services purchased from A1 to a domestic
service provider as part of a service provider agreement. The roaming
agreement between mobile operators A1 and B1 may include an obligation on
B1 to give A1 preferred roaming status. In that case, mobile operator B1 will
initially programme its SIM cards in a way to direct its customers to A1’s network
once they enter A1’s coverage area. Customers of B1 will automatically end up
with the preferred roaming partner unless they manually select another network
operator. Such a preferred roaming status is often agreed upon reciprocally, but
unilateral obligations also exist, e.g., if incumbent operators require this as a
condition for concluding a roaming agreement with a new entrant.
                                               
10 The GSM Association notified the STIRA in 1996, and the IOT in 1997. Both notifications received
conditional exemptions from the cartel prohibition under Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty.
11 The service provider agreements also encompass the wholesale provision of subscriptions and of
national and international mobile calls to domestic subscribers (provision of  “airtime”).
Prospects for improving  competition in mobile roaming 4
(ii) Instead of concluding a roaming agreement with A1, mobile operator B1 may
use a roaming broker. The roaming broker buys wholesale roaming services
from mobile operator A1 (and other mobile operators) and resells them to B1.
With the emergence of roaming brokers, mobile operators may buy roaming
coverage for a large number of countries by contracting with a single entity. An
example for a roaming broker is Comfone Ltd., whose roaming platform is based
on Swisscom’s roaming contracts.
Figure 1: Vertical relationships involved in international roaming
Mobile operator A1 in (visited) country A
Mobile operator B1 in (home) country B
End-user customers in (home) country B
Roaming broker
Service provider in 
(home) country B
Provision of 
wholesale
roaming
Provision of
retail 
roaming
Source: WIK
Pricing principles and billing relationships
The general principles for setting wholesale roaming charges are defined by the GSM
Association. Under the new regime in force since 1998/99, the wholesale roaming
charge – called Inter-Operator Tariff (IOT) - is formally defined as “a tariff between
mobile network operators, charged by the visited network operator to the home network
operator for the use of the visited network” and is unrelated to the retail or wholesale
prices of non-roamed calls.12 The GSM framework requires mobile operators to apply
                                               
12 Up to 1989/99, wholesale roaming charges for mobile originated calls were based on retail tariffs of
non-roamed calls. This link to the visited mobile operator’s prices of non-roamed calls no longer
exists.
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IOTs in a non-discriminatory uniform way to all foreign roaming partners. The
framework does not prevent mobile operators from negotiating discounts, but such
discounting appeared to be largely absent in the past.13
Under the new regime, both mobile originated and mobile terminated calls (outgoing
and incoming roamed calls) can be charged for by the visited network operator. Figures
2 and 3 illustrate the inter-operator billing relationships:
(i) Mobile originated roamed calls (Figure 2): Assume a customer of mobile
operator B1 roams on mobile operator A1’s network and makes a call to his/her
home country B, say to a customer of fixed network operator B2. Mobile network
operator A1 usually hands over the call to a fixed network operator A2 in the
visited country, which conveys the call to the customer’s home country, where it
is handed over to a fixed network operator B2, which terminates the call to the
called subscriber. The inter-operator billing relationship are as follows: The fixed
network operator B2 charges the fixed network operator A2 for terminating the
call. The fixed network operator A2 charges the mobile network operator A1 for
transiting the call and also recovers the termination charge paid to fixed network
operator B2. The visited mobile operator A1 recovers its costs by charging its
IOT for wholesale roaming calls to the customer’s home mobile operator B1.
Figure 2: Billing relationships in case of mobile originated roamed calls
Mobile operator A1 
in (visited) country A
Fixed operator A2
in (visited) country A
Fixed operator B2
in (home) country B
Mobile operator B1 
in (home) country B
bills for roamed call
(IOT)
bills for 
transiting call 
(transit incl. fixed
termination charge)
bills for terminating call
(fixed termination charge)
Source: WIK
                                               
13 See European Commission (2000), p. 8-9.
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For mobile originated calls, IOT dimensions are usually destination (domestic or
international), time of day (peak or off-peak), time unit (10 seconds/30 seconds/1
minute or other), type of terminating network, (fixed or mobile terminated) and/or
may include a set-up fee for each call. For international destinations, operators
usually use some form of zonal pricing, where a uniform IOT is set for a group of
destinations.
(ii) Mobile terminated roamed calls (Figure 3): Assume again that a customer of
mobile operator B1 is roaming on mobile operator A1’s network, but now
receives a call from his/her home country made by a subscriber of fixed network
operator B2. Fixed network operator B2 conveys the call to the visited country,
where it is usually handed over to fixed network operator A2 that hands it over to
the visited mobile operator A1 for termination. The terminating mobile operator
A1 charges the fixed network operator A2 for terminating the call to the visiting
customer. Fixed network operator A2 charges the fixed network operator B2 for
transiting the call and also recovers the termination charge paid to mobile
operator A1. Under the new IOT regime, the visited mobile operator A1 could
also charge the customer’s home mobile operator B1 for the call. Mobile
terminated calls, however, continue to be zero priced, so mobile network
operators have not exploited this possibility opened up by the new IOT regime.14
The GSM Association framework does not deal with pricing of roaming services on the
retail level. Pricing principles are as follows:
- Mobile originated roamed calls: Traditionally, home network operators add a fixed
percentage margin on top of the IOT, with the effect that retail roaming prices of a
home network operator are a reflection of IOTs of visited network operators. The
mark-up varies between 10 and 35% across countries, but is largely uniform within a
given country. Only more recently, a number of mobile operators departed from this
practice by offering single-rate retail tariffs for roaming in certain groups of countries,
including discounted single-rate tariffs if subscribers roam on networks of affiliated
firms.
- Mobile terminated roamed calls: If a customer is called from his/her home country
while roaming on a foreign network, the home mobile operator charges its roaming
customer the price of an international mobile call from the home country to the
visited country.
                                               
14 Under the former regime, a visited network operator could only charge roamers for mobile terminated
calls if the visited network operator charged its own customers for such calls. In Western Europe this
has not been the case. Under the new IOT regime, this restriction no longer applies. Mobile
terminated call charges are now part of the wholesale inter-operator charging and no longer related to
the way a visited network operator charges its own subscribers.
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Figure 3: Billing relationships in case of mobile terminated roamed calls
Mobile operator A1 
in (visited) country A
Fixed operator A2
in (visited) country A
Fixed operator B2
in (home) country B
Mobile operator B1 
in (home) country B
does not bill
(IOT = 0)
bills for 
terminating call 
(mobile termination 
charge)
bills for transiting call
(transit incl. mobile 
termination charge)
Source: WIK
3 Supply-side of wholesale roaming markets
Because, in Western Europe, mobile network licenses are accorded on a national basis,
wholesale roaming markets are typically national. Each country constitutes a distinct
national market for the provision of wholesale roaming services. The supply-side of
wholesale roaming is characterised by a number of features which give rise to
oligopolistic interdependency between the leading players and hardly provide incentives
to engage in a process of competitive IOT undercutting. Those features include
(i) a small number of suppliers in each country and usually a high combined market
share of the two leading operators,
(ii) barriers-to-entry and second-mover disadvantages that protect the leading
operators,
(iii) imperfect substitutes to roaming relationships, and
(iv) a high transparency about IOTs that make competitive price undercuttings
immediately visible.
This situation that has marked wholesale roaming markets since their creation may
change in the future. Given the scarcity of spectrum, an increase in the number of GSM
operators is not a prospect for most Western European countries. However, with
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second-mover disadvantages in wholesale roaming markets gradually disappearing,
and price elasticity of individual firm’s demand for wholesale roaming services
increasing (the reasons are treated in chapter 4.2), new entrant GSM 1800 operators
will get an increasing incentive to win market share by reducing their IOTs and/or offer
discounts on IOTs. These developments are explored in more detail in this chaper.
3.1 Small number of suppliers and high market concentration
As Table 1 shows, the number of mobile operators with GSM licenses in Western
European countries typically ranges from 3 to 4. The only countries with less than three
licensed network operators are currently Luxembourg and Norway. Norway plans to
issue new GSM licenses during autumn 2001, which will increase the number of GSM
licenses to 3-4.
Table 1: Number of providers of GSM wholesale roaming
services, Western Europe, August 2001
Netherlands 5
Austria 4
Denmark 4
Finland 4*
Germany 4
Italy 4
Liechtenstein 4
UK 4
Iceland 3 (6**)
Greece 3 (4**)
Belgium 3
France 3
Portugal 3
Spain 3
Sweden 3
Switzerland 3
Ireland 3
Norway 2 (3-4***)
Luxembourg 2
* GSM operators with local licenses not included.
** Number in brackets also includes GSM mobile operators, which have
already received a license, but did not yet commence service.
*** Number in brackets also includes new GSM mobile operators, which are
likely to be licensed in autumn 2001.
Source: Mobile Communications, GSM Association, WIK
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In each country, the provision of wholesale roaming is generally highly concentrated.
The Mobile Roaming Inquiry of the European Commission showed that, in a large
number of countries in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom), the leading
operator has an estimated market share of over 50%. The two largest mobile operators’
combined share of the national wholesale roaming market is typically above 90%.15 The
leading mobile operators are typically the incumbent GSM 900 operators licensed first,
and those with small or negligible market shares are the new entrant GSM 1800
operators licensed at a later stage.16
3.2 Spectrum scarcity and second-mover disadvantages
New entry
The mobile sector as a whole is characterised by barriers-to-entry of which the scarcity
of spectrum for GSM mobile telecommunications services is the most prominent. The
lack of spectrum limits the number of GSM licenses and, in most Western European
countries, makes it unlikely that additional GSM licenses will be made available in the
future.
Hopes have been placed on mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and new entrant
mobile network operators with UMTS licenses. However, since both of them do not
dispose of GSM spectrum, they will have to use capacity on an existing GSM operator’s
radio access network.
(i) MVNOs have some physical network infrastructure comprising as a minimum a
switching centre, a home location register (HLR) and authentication centre. They
have their own unique mobile network code and issue their own branded SIM
cards. MVNOs take over their customers’s calls and route them to the final
destination on the basis of interconnection contracts with other fixed and/or
mobile network operators. Hence, MVNOs are different to service providers
providers which deliver services entirely over other mobile operators’ networks.
Various service providers claim to be MVNOs, but since they do not meet the
minimum requirements described above, a term such as “enhanced service
providers” would be more appropriate for them. An MVNO in the strict sense
appears to exist in Denmark (Tele2). In Germany, UMTS newcomers Mobilcom
and 3GMobile will get MVNO status for GSM.
                                               
15 European Commission (2000), p. 23.
16 It should be noted that, in various countries, incumbent GSM 900 operators now have also been
allocated additional spectrum in the 1800 MHz range, and likewise GSM 1800 new entrant operators
have been allocated spectrum in the 900 MHz range. We will, however, continue to use the traditional
terms of  “GSM 900 operator” usually denoting an imcumbent, and “GSM 1800 operator” usually
denoting a new entrant licensed at a later stage.
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(ii) In some countries, the spectrum made available for UMTS allowed to grant
UMTS licenses in a number that exceeds the number of existing GSM licenses
(e.g., in Germany, Austria, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and UK). This leads to entry of new mobile operators. Also, in a few countries,
newcomers outbid GSM operators in UMTS auctions (e.g., in Italy and
Denmark). As a result of regulatory obligations or commercial agreements,
newcomers will be able to use capacity on existing GSM networks during roll-out
of their UMTS networks. This is usually called 3G-2G national roaming.
However, neither MVNOs nor UMTS newcomers will be able to provide wholesale
roaming services to international roaming partners. Both of them do not dispose of GSM
spectrum, and neither MVNO arrangements nor national roaming agreements will allow
the reselling of wholesale capacity purchased on existing GSM networks to foreign
roaming partners. The number of providers of GSM wholesale roaming services,
therefore, will not increase by those developments.
Second mover disadvantages
The practice of most Western European countries of sequentially issuing GSM licenses
(illustrated in Table 2) created various second-mover disadvantages in the mobile
sector. The persistently high combined market share of the two leading mobile
operators (usually GSM 900 operators) in wholesale roaming markets is a reflection of
this. New entrant GSM 1800 mobile operators licensed at a later stage had to face two
important disadvantages when trying to generate wholesale roaming traffic on their
networks:
(i) Unavailability of dual band GSM 900 and 1800 handsets disadvantaged new
entrant GSM 1800 operators when selling wholesale roaming to incumbent GSM
900 operators and seeking preferred roaming status from them. Initially, the
majority of subscribers of GSM 900 networks could not roam on GSM 1800
networks due to their handsets that were only 900 MHz compatible. This was
also a reason, why GSM 900 operators, initially, were less interested in
concluding roaming agreements with GSM 1800 operators. However, as 1800
MHz networks are rolled out, and as GSM 900 operators are also awarded 1800
MHz frequencies, dual band handsets are now becoming widely deployed. GSM
900 operators now perceive a benefit from offering roaming on 1800 MHz
networks in other countries to their subscribers. In fact, where GSM 1800
operators have rolled out their networks, they may provide higher signal
strength, better voice quality and higher availability rates than GSM 900
operators. As a result, any disadvantage for new entrant GSM 1800 operators
related to availability of dual band handsets is likely to disappear. The ability of
new entrant GSM 1800 operators to compete for wholesale roaming market
share with incumbent GSM 900 operators will increase due to the greater
penetration of dual-band handsets.
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Table 2: Date of launch of GSM networks in Western Europe, August 2001
Rank in market entry
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Austria Mobilkom
(12/93)
Max.mobil
(10/96)
One
(10/98)
Tele.ring
(5/00) - -
Belgium Belgacom
(1/94)
Mobistar
(8/96)
KPN Orange
(3/99) - - -
Denmark TDC
(7/92)
Sonofon
(7/92)
Telia
(1/98)
Mobilix
(3/98) - -
Finland Radiolinja
(12/91)
Sonera
(7/92)
Telia
(3/98)
Suomen 2G
(2/01) - -
France Orange
(7/92)
SFR
(12/92)
Bouygues
(5/96) - - -
Germany D2-Vodafone
(6/92)
T-Mobil
(7/92)
E-Plus
(5/94)
VIAG Interk.
(10/98) - -
Greece Panafon
(7/93)
Stet Hellas
(7/93)
Cosmote
(3/98)
Info-Quest
(na) - -
Iceland PTT
(12/94)
Tal
(5/98)
Íslandssími
(3/01)
IMC Ísland
(planned
1/02)
Halló!-Frjáls
(planned)
Lína.Net
(planned)
Ireland Eircell
(7/93)
Esat Digifone
(3/9)
Meteor
(02/01) - - -
Italy TIM
(4/95)
Omnitel Pronto
(10/95)
Wind
(3/99)
Blu
(5/00) - -
Liechten-
stein
Telecom FL
(na)
Tele2
(3/00)
VIAG Europl.
(8/00)
Mobilkom
(9/00) - -
Luxem-
bourg
P+T
(7/93)
Millicom
(5/98) - - - -
Nether-
lands KPN Mobile(7/94)
Libertel-
Vodafone
(9/95)
Telfort
(10/98)
Dutchtone
(1/99)
Ben
(2/99) -
Norway Telenor
(5/93)
NetCom
(9/93) - - - -
Portugal TMN
(10/92)
Telecel-
Vodafone
(10/92)
Optimus
(9/98) - - -
Spain Telefónica
Móviles
(7/95)
Airtel
(10/95)
Amena
(1/99) - - -
Sweden Tele2
(9/92)
Europolitan
(9/92)
Telia Mobile
(11/92) - - -
Switzer-
land
Swisscom
Mob
(3/93)
Sunrise
(12/98)
Orange
Switzerl.
(6/99)
- - -
UK Vodafone
(7/92)
One-2-One
(9/93)
BT Cellnet *
(1/94)
Orange UK
(4/94) - -
* Although BT Cellnet was only third in launching its GSM network, it must be regarded as an incumbent
since it  had a license for NMT (analogue mobile telecommunications) networks and was well
established as a mobile operator before One-2-One and Orange entered the market. Vodafone, which
was first in launching a GSM network also had a NMT license.
Source: Mobile Communications, GSM Association, WIK
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(ii) Lower coverage rates during network roll-out were a second major handicap for
new entrant GSM 1800 operators, when seeking preferred roaming status from
roaming partners and/or attracting foreign subscribers to their networks. In a
number of countries (e.g., Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Spain, Norway), GSM 900
operators are required to provide national roaming to GSM 1800 operators
during a transitional period, and in others (e.g., Germany) network operators
provide national roaming for commercial reasons. However, buyers of national
roaming services usually are not allowed to resell these services to foreign
network operators. National roaming, whether mandated or commercial, allows
a network operator during network roll-out to increase its coverage vis-à-vis
domestic subscribers, but not in relation to roaming subscribes of foreign
network operators. Despite national roaming, new entrants in the wholesale
(international) roaming market are severely disadvantaged. Without nationwide
coverage, it is more difficult to get preferred roaming status from foreign roaming
partners and/or generate roaming traffic on one’s network. Again, this problem
will disappear in the longer term: GSM 1800 new entrants in many countries will
have soon rolled out their networks to nationwide coverage and, hence, will be
able to provide the same quality of wholesale roaming services to foreign
roaming partners as incumbent GSM 900 operators.
3.3 Imperfect substitutes to wholesale roaming
Apart from call-back applications, there are no alternatives to roaming relationships.
With call-back applications, home network operators can enable their subscribers to
make mobile calls in other countries outside traditional roaming agreements. Call-back
applications can substitute outbound roaming calls by calls in a reverse direction. Calls
in a reverse direction are set up by the home operator itself and terminated using
interconnection agreements. Call-back applications of European mobile operators are
based on USSD (Unstructured Supplementary Service Data). USSD is a means of
transmitting information over a GSM network which has some similarities with SMS,
since both use the GSM network's signalling path. Call-back applications are already
marketed in two variants:
(i) as a pre-pay service addressed at international customers with an additional
SIM card (e.g., Swisscom provides such a service under the “EasyRoam” brand
for use outside of Switzerland),
(ii) as a pre-pay service addressed at domestic residential customers for use with
their regular SIM card (e.g., T-Mobil).
Call-back solutions, however, cannot be regarded as a full substitute to roaming. First,
from a subscriber’s perspective, alternative (i) may be regarded as inferior, because it
requires an additional SIM and the allocation of a new mobile number. This, however,
might no longer be an obstacle in the longer term, following the introduction of multi-SIM
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handsets. Second, and more important, call-back solutions can only substitute mobile
originated calls to the subscriber’s home country. Domestic calls within the visited
country or mobile terminated calls (incoming calls) necessitate a traditional roaming
arrangement between visited and home network operator. Hence, from a home network
operator’s perspective, call-back solutions are only a partial and imperfect substitute for
traditional wholesale roaming arrangements.
3.4 Transparency of competitors’ IOTs
Wholesale roaming markets are characterised by a high degree of transparency about
IOTs. Mobile operators notify any change of IOTs through the GSM InfoCentre to
roaming partners. The IOTs of a particular mobile operator listed on the InfoCentre are
electronically accessible to all GSM MoU members, with the exclusion of competitors in
the domestic wholesale roaming market. Competitors, however, may usually find out
about the IOTs offered by competing mobile operators through affiliated operators in
other countries. There is also a straightforward way to calculate competitors’ IOTs,
simply by deducting the retail margin of 10 to 35% (which is usually publicly known)
from published retail roaming prices. Information about IOTs, if available routinely in the
market, makes IOT reductions immediately visible to competitors and reduces
incentives to competitive price undercutting.
A different situation exists with regard to individual discounts on IOTs, which must not
be revealed on the InfoCentre. Such discounting has been largely absent in the past,
but if used more intensely in the future (see the following chapter 4.2), this would
reduce price transparency on the supply-side and would provide incentives for more
price competition.
4 Demand-side of wholesale roaming markets
Oligopolistic interdependence is not the sole possible reason for the price rigidity that
characterised wholesale roaming markets in the past. It also does not explain the fact
that new entrant GSM 1800 operators with negligible market shares, in many instances,
charge IOTs above IOTs of incumbent GSM 900 operators. The reason is to be found
on the demand-side of wholesale roaming. As is discussed on more detail below,
foreign roaming partners
(i) face little competition in retail roaming markets at home, and, therefore, little
pressure to seek more favourable IOTs in order to cut costs,
(ii) have insufficient control over their subscribers’ network selection in the visited
country, which makes demand for roaming on a given visited network largely
insensitive to price changes, gives rise to demand externalities and reduces
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incentives to offer preferred roaming status and/or traffic growth in exchange for
discounts on IOTs.
This situation is likely to change for two reasons described in more detail below. First,
retail roaming markets are likely to become more competitive with new entry of mobile
operators, and business markets growing into a pan-European dimension.  Second, and
even more important, the introduction of over-the-air programming of SIM cards will
enable home mobile operators to direct their customers to the visited networks with the
lowest IOTs. This will remove demand externalities and create incentives to agree on
discounts on IOTs in exchange for preferred roaming status and traffic growth. On the
supply side of wholesale roaming markets, the incentive to agree on such discount
schemes should be particularly pronounced for new entrant GSM 1800 mobile networks
operators with so far negligible market shares.
4.1 Lack of competitive pressure in downstream retail roaming markets
So far, structural conditions of retail roaming markets are not conducive to price
competition.  A high combined market share of the two leading players, together with
pronounced second-mover disadvantages of new entrant GSM 1800 operators and
other providers of retail roaming services explains the lack of competition.
High concentration
Compared with wholesale roaming services, the number of suppliers of retail roaming
services in a given country is usually higher, and concentration rates are lower. This is
due to the existence of independent service providers. The combined share of the two
leading mobile operators of retail roaming revenue is usually still over 60%, compared
with over 90% for wholesale roaming.17
Barriers-to-entry and second-mover disadvantages
Because of spectrum scarcity, the number of GSM licences is limited, and in most
countries additional GSM licenses are unlikely to be issued. Nevertheless, as discussed
above, new types of providers of GSM services can enter the market:
(i) MVNOs have appeared in Denmark (Tele2) and will soon appear soon in
Germany (Mobilcom and 3GMobile).
(ii) Allocation of UMTS licenses will in some countries increase the number of
mobile operators by one or two.18
                                               
17 European Commission (2000), p. 17.
18 In Germany, this is not regarded as „national roaming“, although it may be technically identical. In
regulatory terms, roaming as defined in Germany is restricted to the same market and aims to extend
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Both MVNOs and UMTS newcomers will be able to conclude GSM (and UMTS)
international roaming agreements in order to provide retail roaming services to their
customers.
New entrants face substantial second-mover disadvantages as can be seen in the case
of existing GSM 1800 operators. They are far less successful in extracting retail
roaming revenue from their customer base due to the preponderance of residential and
prepaid customers (which reflects later market entry). Residential contract customers
typically generate less roaming revenue per user than business customers. Also, in the
past, roaming services could not be made available to pre-pay customers. This only
changes now, with the introduciton of Intelligent Network functionality (CAMEL19) that
allows mobile operators to increase their control of roaming activity and to promote
offerings of pre-pay roaming.
Other ways of market entry are possible on the retail level: Firms may enter as service
providers or indirect access providers. The competitive impact, however, is likely to be
very limited:
(i) Independent service providers contribute little in intensifying price competition
for retail roaming services. Because service providers cannot directly conclude
roaming agreements with mobile operators in other countries or with a roaming
broker, they simply resell roaming services purchased by the home network
operator they have a service provision agreement with. When customers of
service providers roam abroad, all calls are billed to the relevant home network
operator by the visited network operator. The home network operator adds a
handling charge before billing the roamed calls to the domestic service provider.
Home network operator and service provider share the handling charge.
Service providers would have a greater impact on competition if they could
conclude roaming agreements. Since they would be too small to conclude
multiple roaming agreements with a large number of mobile network operators,
they would have to have access to roaming brokers (which so far is not the
case). Roaming brokers would have a central role in providing wholesale
roaming access to service providers.
(ii) Some countries have introduced mobile carrier selection (e.g., Finland,
Denmark, Germany, Spain, UK and Norway), but there does not seem to have
been market entry by indirect access operators, except in Finland. If mobile
carrier selection was available, subscribers could use their existing connection
to a domestic mobile network operator to route calls to a selected operator
(called “indirect access operator”). Customers would continue to have a
                                                                                                                                          
the availability of an operator’s network for his customers. An UMTS license holder, however, cannot
sign a GSM national roaming agreement with a GSM license holder extending the availability of his
network (roaming), quite simply because he does not have a GSM mobile network. See Kurth (2001).
19 Customised Applications for Mobile Network Enhanced Logic.
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subscription with their access operator, but would be able to make calls with the
indirect access operator. A customer could use indirect access operators on a
call-by-call basis by using a prefix before the dialled number (or on a pre-
selection basis, if available in the country).
As far as retail roaming calls are concerned, indirect access will be of a limited
impact. As usually understood, carrier selection allows domestic customers to
use an existing connection with a domestic mobile network operator to route
domestic or international calls through another operator (indirect access
operator). A roaming customer, however, would have to use roaming access in a
visited network to route calls through a third operator. So far, the technical,
commercial and regulatory basis appears to be uncertain. But even though
carrier selection and indirect access may not be applicable for roaming calls, it
could still have an indirect effect through lowering prices for domestic and
international mobile calls. The alternatives to roaming calls discussed below –
calling cards and pre-paid cards – could become more attractive substitutes and
impose pressure on retail roaming prices.
Imperfect substitutes to retail roaming
From an end-customer’s perspective, retail roaming services are only partially and
imperfectly substitutable by call-back services or pre-pay services bought in the visited
country.
(i) International call-back services are an alternative to outbound roaming calls.
Some are marketed on a European-wide basis to business customers as an
additional service to be used beside the customer’s regular subscription (with a
separate SIM), some are marketed to domestic residential customers as part of
regular pre-pay packages. The introduction of multi-SIM handsets could facilitate
the use of alternative SIM cards and make call-back services a good substitute
for outbound international roaming calls.
(ii) Another alternative for customers when travelling abroad is to purchase a pre-
pay card from a mobile operator licensed in the visited country and use it in the
GSM handset instead of the SIM card of the home network operator (this is
sometimes called “plastic roaming”). The price of a pre-pay international call
may in some cases be higher than the rate per minute of a roamed international
call. However, the price of a pre-pay domestic call appears to be usually lower
than the rate per minute of a roamed domestic call. Also, in contrast to incoming
roamed calls, no charge is to be paid for incoming calls in case of a pre-pay
card. Hence, the savings on domestic calls and incoming calls can justify
purchasing a pre-pay card. The introduction of multi-SIM handsets will also
facilitate “plastic roaming”.
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4.2 Customer ignorance, insufficient control over network selection, and
demand externalities
Mobile operators usually offer their subscribers the choice between roaming on several
networks in other countries. For pricing retail roaming services, two approaches are
applied:
(i) The traditional way is to charge subscribers for roaming depending on which
network subscribers actually roam onto. In this case, mobile operators put a
fixed percentage margin on top of the IOT paid to the visited network operator.
(ii) Alternatively, some mobile operators offer single-rate tariffs for roaming in a
particular group of countries, with discounted single-rate tariffs if calls are made
using the network of an affiliated operator.
The first approach necessarily entails a low degree of transparency on the subscribers’
side. Where retail roaming prices are set by marking up wholesale roaming charges,
there are thousands of possible variations of international roaming charges in Europe
alone. In the  past, mobile operators made little effort to inform their customers about
relative prices of roaming on alternative networks in a visited country. The result is that
customers are usually ignorant about the prices applied when roaming abroad. In
addition, many subscribers are not familiar with manual network selection that would
allow them to switch to the cheapest network.
When a customer enters a country, he/she usually leaves it to the handset to
automatically choose a network. SIM cards contain a pre-programmed preferred list of
networks. The handset looks at the preferred list and searches for the first network on
the list. If it finds the network’s signal, it will log on this network. If not, it will turn to
another one depending on signal strength. Although mobile operators can direct their
subscribers to preferred networks through initial programming of the SIM card, they are
unable to make any subsequent modifications. The preferred list in the SIM card is not
updated to reflect changes in IOTs. Customer ignorance about relative retail roaming
prices and manual selection of networks make the choice of the visited network largely
dependent on the original programming of the SIM card.
Of cause, customers will usually control their roaming bill ex post and may have a rough
perception of the average price per minute of roaming in a particular country. This will
have an influence on the number of roaming calls in a visited country and the volume of
roaming minutes, but not on the network selected.
Customer ignorance and operators’ lack of control over network selection gives rise to
an externality. To demonstrate this, assume that
(i) a visited mobile operator A1 decreases its IOT below the level of competing
mobile operators in country A;
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(ii) the home mobile operators in country B reduce the retail price for roaming on
network A1 by the same percentage rate, but are unable to redirect their
subscribers to mobile operator A1, and
(iii) subscribers of home mobile operators in country B remain ignorant about the
change in relative retail roaming prices, but take note of a decrease in the
average price per minute of a roaming call in the visited country (as a result of
inspecting their monthly bill).
A decrease in A1’s IOT, with a corresponding decrease in the retail prices of roaming
on A1’s network, will lead to a decrease of the perceived average price of roaming in
country A. This will increase the total quantity of minutes roamed on networks in country
A, but shares of visited network operators in country A will remain roughly the same.
The decrease in A1’s IOTs will benefit both A1 and its competitors, depending on their
market shares.
This externality provides disincentives for mobile operators to lower IOTs. The smaller a
mobile operator (in terms of its share of the national wholesale roaming market), the
less likely it is to internalise the demand increasing effect of a decrease of its IOT. As a
result, smaller operators, in particular, have an incentive to charge high IOTs, since a
reduction in IOTs would hardly affect the volume of roaming minutes they can generate
on their networks.20 Whereas a large mobile operator must account for the impact of its
IOT on its roaming volume, a small operator faces a very inelastic demand for roaming
and thus can impose higher mark-ups above the marginal costs of providing roaming
calls. A mobile operator may have a small market share in its wholesale roaming
market. Yet under the assumption that customers base their roaming decisions only on
perceived average retail roaming prices, a small visited mobile operator has market
power in its wholesale roaming market. Indeed, a mobile operator can refrain from
following other competitors in reducing IOTs and hardly suffer a reduction in its share of
the wholesale roaming market.
GSM Europe, the European Interest Group of the GSM Association, recently adopted a
“Code of Conduct for Information on International Retail Roaming Prices” to promote
existing best practices, such as providing information over the customer service number
or the Internet site of the home operator, and to encourage other options such as
information via SMS, Fax on demand, e-mail, WAP, roaming guides, information
material at points of border entry/exit, leaflets accompanying the bill, and information via
retail outlets. Such measures can increase users’ awareness of international retail
                                               
20 A conceptually similar problem occurs in fixed-to-mobile calls, if the calling party is ignorant about the
terminating operator and, hence, about the price of the call. As a result of this ignorance, the end-user
relies on an estimated average price of fixed-to-mobile calls to all mobile operators. Consumer
ignorance implies that mobile operators can increase the charge for mobile termination without feeling
the full demand reducing effect of the increase. This has been explored, in particular, by the Australian
ACCC (2001). For a general exposition of the theory behind, see e.g.  Laffont and Tirole (2000), p.
184 – 187.
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roaming issues. However, given the complexity of the retail roaming tariff structures
involved, it is debatable whether existing externalities can be remedied by more
information alone.
Recently, a number of operators have started to offer averaged retail roaming prices,
which give customers a single rate for roaming in a range countries, e.g., Vodafone,
Orange, T-Mobile, BT Cellnet, KPN Mobile, and TIM have introduced such tariffs.
Single-rate tariffs have the advantage of providing greater transparency of tariffs and
allow users to better compare offerings between mobile operators when choosing a
subscription. However, they do not guarantee that customers roam on the least-cost
network. In fact, they change nothing as far as the arbitrary nature of network selection
is concerned. Single-rate tariffs will not provide incentives for IOT reductions or
discounting as long as home network operators cannot influence network selection of
their subscribers.
The market externality can be removed by the introduction of SIM Application Toolkit in
combination with over-the-air-programming of the SIM card. The SIM Application Toolkit
extends the role of the SIM card, and makes it a key interface between the mobile
terminal and the network. Using the SIM Toolkit, the SIM can be programmed over the
air to modify the list of preferred networks. Customers can then be redirected to the
network which has lowered its IOTs, or they can be moved between networks to benefit
from peak/off-peak differentials.21 The introduction of SIM Application Toolkit and SIM
over-the-air programming will give home mobile operators control over network
selection of their subscribers. Visited network operators will have an incentive to offer
discounts in return for being granted preferred roaming status. Such discounting can be
based on the volume of revenue or minutes, or the growth in the volume of revenue or
minutes. This can benefit new entrant operators which will find it more beneficial then
now to offer discounts and/or undercut incumbents’ IOTs. On the demand side, the
driving force will probably be integrated pan-European mobile operators, which can
offer the combined roaming volume and growth of affiliated operators active in several
countries. Table 3 illustrates the potential of Vodafone and other pan-European
operators in combining demand of affiliated companies for wholesale roaming.
                                               
21 AT&T Wireless has developed an Intelligent Roaming Database which ranks the list of mobile
operators by priority, and which is updated and downloaded over the air into each digital multi-network
phone every month.
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Table 3: Affiliated firms of pan-European mobile operators, Western Europe,
September 2001 (percentage direct or indirect ownership)
Vodafone Orange T-Mobile mmO2 TIM KPN Telia
Austria
-
Connect
Austria
(17,5%)
Max.mobil
(100%) -
Mobilkom
(25%) - -
Belgium Belgacom
(25%)
Mobistar
(50,7%) - - -
KPN
Orange
(100%)
-
Denmark - Mobilix(53,6%) - - - -
Telia DK
(100%)
Finland
- - - - - -
Telia
Finland
(100%)
France SFR
(31,9%)
Orange
France
(100%)
SFR
(20,8%)
Bouygues
(10,7%) - -
Germany D2-
Vodafone
(99,2%)
-
T-Mobil
(100%) VIAG Interk(100%) -
E-Plus
(77,5%) -
Greece Panafon
(52,8%) - - -
Stet Hellas
(52,29%) - -
Ireland Eircell
(100%) - -
Esat Digif.
(100%) - -
Italy Omnitel
Pronto
(76,1%)
Wind
(43,4% ) -
Blu
(20 %)
TIM - -
Nether-
lands Libertel-Vodafone
(70%)
Dutchtone
(100% )
Ben
(49,9%)
Telfort
(100%) -
KPN Mobile
Netherlands
(100%) -
Norway - - - - - - NetCom(100%)
Portugal Telecel-
Vodafone
(50,9%)
Optimus
(20% ) - - - - -
Spain Airtel
(91,6%) - - -
Amena
(26,4%) - --
Sweden Europolitan
(71,1%) - - - - -
Telia
Mobile
(100%)
Switzer-
land SwisscomMobile
(25%)
Orange
Comms.
Switzerl.
(85%)
- - - - -
UK Vodafone
UK
(100%)
Orange
UK
(100%)
One-2-One
(100%)
BT Cellnet
(100%) - - -
Source: WIK
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5 Conclusions and implications for application of non-
discrimination rules
The developments described above are likely to modify the structural conditions of
wholesale roaming markets and initiate a process of competitive discounting and IOT
reductions.
(i) With the introduction of SIM application toolkit and SIM over-the-air
programming, home mobile operators will be able to direct customers to
networks with the lowest IOTs. This will impose incentives on visited mobile
operators to offer discounts on IOTs in exchange for preferred roaming status
and traffic growth. The demand externality that currently exists will disappear.
The incentive to lower IOTs and offer discounts will be particularly large for
smaller new entrant GSM 1800 operators.
(ii) As dual mode handsets become ubiquitous and as existing GSM 1800 operators
reach nationwide coverage, second-mover disadvantages for GSM 1800
operators will disappear. When seeking preferred roaming status from roaming
partners and/or attracting foreign subscribers to their networks, they will be able
to compete with similar coverage rates with incumbent GSM 900 operators.
Given the small shares of the wholesale roaming market that GSM 1800
operators currently dispose of, they should have a particular incentive to win
market share by offering discounts on IOTs and/or lowering IOTs.
This is likely to initiate a process of IOT undercutting, where the leading GSM 900
operators will have to follow.
On the demand side, it will be the GSM 900 operators that will put pressure on IOTs
and ask for discounts given their larger retail roaming volumes. It may be that pan-
European mobile operators combine roaming volumes of affiliated operators in various
countries to get higher discounts. This could discriminate against home mobile
operators that do not have a pan-European footprint. However, there are two factors
which work against discrimination:
(i) In the longer term, price discrimination assumes that mobile operators have the
ability to segment foreign roaming partners and, more importantly, prevent
arbitrage occurring between them. Roaming brokers, even though they are
unlikely to accumulate as much roaming traffic as the larger pan-European
operators could be an important force that works against discrimination.
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(ii) Competition in the provision of retail roaming is likely to increase with market
entry of new mobile operators (MVNOs, UMTS newcomers that will also offer
GSM roaming to their customers), and as a result of the creation of a pan-
European market for roaming services for internationally mobile business
customers. If retail roaming became more competitive, the bargaining power of
pan-European operators would not create competition policy problems. This,
however, would have to be studied more thoroughly in the light of future
developments.
The GSM framework requires that mobile operators apply their IOTs in a non-
discriminatory way to all foreign roaming partners. This echoes non-discrimination
provisions in competition and telecommunication laws and licensing conditions of
mobile operators. However, a restrictive interpretation of these provisions may prevent
roaming partners, and in particular new entrant GSM 1800 operators, from offering
discounts in exchange for preferred roaming status and/or for additional traffic volume.
Also, non-discrimination rules should not prevent mobile operators with large numbers
of roaming subscribers to put pressure on wholesale roaming charges by asking for
discounts, provided retail roaming markets become more competitive.22 As long as
retail markets are not sufficiently competitive, it is important that discounts offered to
affiliates of pan-European operators on the basis of volume and/or traffic growth are
made available to all foreign roaming partners including roaming brokers.23
                                               
22 The European Commission (2000), p. 24, also acknowledges that the principle of non-discrimination
applied by licensing, competition and regulatory rules may act as a disincentive to price wholesale
roaming services more competitively.
23 The danger of discrimination and foreclosure led the European Commission to impose a non
discrimination obligation on Vodafone as a result of its merger with Mannesmann. Pursuant to the
Vodafone AirTouch/Mannesmann decision, Vodafone has to provide third parties non-discriminatory
access to discounted IOTs up to April 2003. Due to these undertakings, Vodafone and its subsidiaries
are obliged to make discounted IOTs available to other mobile operators. See European Commission
(2001).
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